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Introduction 
In their 1998 review article, James March and Johan Olsen alerted IR institutionalists to pay more 
attention to the sources and dynamics of ‘inefficient history’ in international institutions (March and 
Olsen 1998). According to the authors, history is ‘inefficient’ where institutions do not linearly adapt to 
changing state preferences and power constellations due to endogenous dynamics. In the meantime IO 
researchers have taken up this challenge, yet mostly the roots of historical inefficiency have been 
attributed to the bureaucratic organs of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Weaver, 2008). This research 
note, by contrast, draws attention to the fact that even state-driven politics is not linear in IOs due to 
locked-in formal rules and endogenous sources of power. Following up on works which suggest that 
historical institutionalism (HI) offers valuable concepts for explaining institutional inertia and gradual 
rather than abrupt change in global politics (Fioretos, 2011; Farrell and Newman, 2010; Chwieroth, 
2013), I carve out under what conditions different types of gradual change are most likely to occur. I 
suggest that HI is particularly well-equipped to capture change in constellations where states can exploit 
their institutional veto powers to block attempts at IO reform. These are widespread constellations in 
IOs, where principles such as one state, one vote, grant smaller states disproportionate votes or seats on 
IO governing bodies. Pressure for change by great powers that are relatively disadvantaged by formal 
decision rules therefore does not lead to linear adaptation, but often results in complex and gradual 
modes of change such as ‘layering’ and ‘drift.’  
Linear, deliberate reform, by contrast, is the established domain of principal-agent (PA) analysis. I will 
argue in the following section that PA concepts are best applicable where reformers control both, 
material powers and the formal decision-making process. The subsequent section then presents how HI 
notions of gradual change can help to fill the gap left by PA analysis. Finally, I propose an explanatory 
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heuristic linking types of IO reform coalitions to types of change in IOs. I conclude with some remarks 
on methodology.  
 
1. Principal-agent analysis and the challenge of unilateral influence in IOs 
Since international organizations (IO) have re-entered institutionalist scholarship in International 
Relations (IR, see Abbott and Snidal, 1998), a burgeoning literature seeks to explain the relative 
autonomy and the conditions of change in IOs. Much of this research has been conducted within the 
principal-agent framework, focusing on the question of whether and how states (the principals) control 
change in IOs (the agents). While this framing has spurred a productive research agenda, like any 
research paradigm it has also attracted criticism. One line of criticism questions the assumption that IOs 
are to be conceived as rational ‘agents’. Constructivists have argued, for example, that their internal 
predispositions make IO bureaucracies culture-driven rather than goal-oriented agents (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004; Weaver, 2008). But also from a rationalist perspective, the idea that IOs are coherent 
agents capable of goal-oriented action is often unrealistic. Organizational fragmentation and 
bureaucratic politics undermine corporate agency in IOs (Graham, 2013; Hanrieder, 2013; Kassim and 
Menon, 2003). Where IOs are not responsive to external incentives, PA mechanisms of control are 
rendered ineffective (Graham, 2013). Hence, challenges to IO agency are important challenges to PA 
explanations, too. 
While these are important limitations, it is another line of criticism that this research note aims to 
contribute to: namely, that  the principal-side of agency theory rests on equally problematic assumptions. 
PA analysis rests on  a formalistic conception of IO politics that prioritizes the formal decision-making 
process over other forms of influence in IOs. In fact, the legalist premise that member states govern 
international organizations via the PA contract is fundamental to PA research (Nielson and Tierney, 
2003). In the PA view, states delegate authority to and re-contract with IOs to realize joint preferences 
via the agent (Hawkins et al., 2006). This emphasis on the formal contract is challenged in particular by 
students of unilateral, and often informal, channels of state influence in IOs (Urpelainen, 2012, p. 707):  
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States are not a board of directors that first resolve their disputes, then write a legally binding 
contract to delegate, and finally discipline the bureaucrat. In addition to pursuing their interests 
by bargaining over the delegation contract, states can exert unilateral influence on policy 
implementation by the bureaucrat. 
The possibility of unilateral influence is a common and important feature in IO politics. Where member 
states disagree on how to work through IOs, formal re-contracting is not the dominant method of change. 
Rather, states will seek to influence IOs individually, and often informally. Randall Stone argues, for 
example, that great powers will find ways to shape IO behavior outside formal channels, for example 
by biasing policy implementation through their engagement in administrative organs (Stone, 2011; 
Urpelainen, 2012).  
The possibility of unilateral influence challenges the analytical utility of PA concepts in two main 
respects. For one, unilateral influence collapses the dichotomous principal-versus-agent 
conceptualization of IO change, i.e. the idea that IO change is either based on the principals’ ‘common 
agency’ or, in case of disagreement among principals, on autonomous bureaucratic agency and rent-
seeking (Copelovitch, 2010). Stone rather claims that zones of bureaucratic discretion offer precisely 
the margin within which powerful states can influence IO activities across the PA divide (Stone, 2011). 
Policy implementation in IOs therefore tends to be biased in the favor of the great powers that 
circumvent collective decision-making through their privileged influence on IO bureaucrats (see also 
Urpelainen, 2012). Furthermore, the possibility of unilateral influence problematizes the legalist notion 
of state power endorsed by PA theorists. The PA approach is premised on ‘a strictly formal notion of 
power, which flows through authoritative rule structures specified in constitutions, articles of agreement, 
or charters’ (Nielson and Tierney, 2003: 251; cf. Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006). This does not mean 
that PA scholars deny power politics and great power influence. However, the underlying expectation 
is that major powers will be able to dominate the bargaining process and thereby the collective principal, 
and hence that the PA contract remains the adequate shortcut for assessing influence in IOs. What ‘IO 
unilateralism’ suggests, by contrast, is that material and formal power should be treated separately 
instead of lumped together with in the concept of ‘member state principal’. Both sources of power may 
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be causally related as when material power can be translated into formal influence, but often there 
remains a considerably discrepancy.  
Indeed, great powers are relatively disadvantaged by formal IO rules. The United Nations organizations 
that follow the one state, one vote principle, grant weaker states disproportionate formal powers. But 
also the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions favor weaker states in relative terms, despite 
the weighted voting system (Stone, 2011, p. 18). These rules can be circumvented by informal means or 
by exerting bargaining power in member state negotiations. But in many cases they also constrain the 
impact of great power influence on IO change, by enabling small states to block certain changes. These 
considerations underline that the complex interplay between rules and power within international 
institutions is an ongoing theoretical challenge for IR institutionalists (Stone, 2009, p. 48–49; see Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005). To shed light on this blind spot of PA analysis, IR scholars can draw on insights 
from historical institutionalism (see Fioretos, 2011). This research tradition in fact starts from the 
observation of an institutional friction between formal rules and material power.  
 
2. Gradual change in the shadow of reform blockades 
The very fact that states turn to unilateral and informal strategies of influence indicates that change in 
international organizations is not always controlled by a coherent actor or coalition. Yet the absence of 
negotiated reform is not the same as non-change. This observation is central to recent historical 
institutionalist works on gradual modes of institutional change. Mostly orientated to explaining change 
in national economic policies, the works of Kathleen Thelen and colleagues transcend the classic 
historical institutionalist focus on stability. These authors rather argue that ‘path dependent’ institutional 
reproduction becomes itself transformative over time. Importantly, this dynamism is an implication of 
the coercive and power-laden nature of institutions, i.e. the dual insight that formal institutions confer 
power on certain actors while being dependent on the influx of resources from the institutional 
environment (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Hence on the one hand, the actors 
privileged by specific institutions seek to capitalize on their formal positions and defend their privileges, 
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but on the other hand powerful actors will emerge that challenge the institution from the outside. 
Challengers that are disadvantaged by institutional structures will seek ways to modify institutions even 
if formal revision is blocked by institutional veto players (Hacker, 2004; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 1999). 
This dynamism led historical institutionalists to identify patterns of gradual change that fall outside the 
category of all-out ‘revision’ (Hacker, 2004) or ‘displacement’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) – and thus 
also beyond the idea of principal-induced reform in IOs. I will focus on the two most pertinent patterns 
of gradual institutional transformation, namely ‘layering’ and ‘drift’.i  
Both layering and drift describe incremental reconfigurations of institutions that are not centrally 
controlled, but emerge out of the interplay between institutional constraints and exogenous challenges. 
First, layering describes a pattern of change whereby new institutional elements are introduced on top 
of or alongside existing ones (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 15). Layering occurs where reformers can 
or do not alter core institutions, for example because these are protected by veto players or by legal lock-
in, but instead graft additional components upon the institutional core. A prominent example of layering 
is the introduction of a private pension system alongside an existing and entrenched public pension 
system (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 23). But also in IOs new ‘layers’ are often grafted on established 
institutions that are not removed, but rather supplemented (or eventually supplanted) by the new 
elements. The International Labour Organization (ILO), for example, has reacted to the growing 
ratification gap regarding its numerous conventions and recommendations with the overarching 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The Declaration and its distinct monitoring 
and review mechanisms now interact with establihed ILO law, thus altering the overall normative output 
of the organization (Helfer, 2006: 709-711).Secondly, drift refers to a mode of change whereby formally 
stable institutions alter their impact due to insufficient updating. Changes in the institution’s 
environment such as demographic or economic changes that are not reflected in the operation of the 
institutions thus mean that the impact of institutions erodes even though they are formally stable 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 16). Revisionists can therefore undermine an institution simply by 
vetoing reform attempts at adapting it to evolving circumstances. The combination of endogenous non-
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decisions ensured by the institutional power of revisionists and of exogenous changes can thereby lead 
to an institution’s marginalization that is not manifested in specific events or reforms, but nevertheless 
consequential for the operation of the institution. In this vein, Jacob Hacker argues in his analysis of the 
US welfare that where policies are not adapted to encompass new social risks, the seeming stability of 
the welfare state actually amounts to its hollowing out (Hacker, 2004). Regulatory drift is also common 
in international politics where institutions are often slow at adapting to changes in their regulatory 
environment – technological changes such as the development of new weaponry, changes in the natural 
environment not covered by environmental regimes, or social and economic changes. For example, 
Alexander Betts argues that the global refugee regime is failing to extend protection to new categories 
of refugees that flee their states for reasons other than targeted individual persecution by governments 
(Betts, 2013) – a classic case of regulatory erosion or drift.      
These categories of gradual change help to conceptualize modes of institutional change in world politics 
that lie between all-out reform or total inertia (see also Chwieroth, 2013). Beyond this descriptive value-
added, the following section proposes an explanatory heuristic of institutional constellations and the PA-
based and HI-based types of change associated with them.  
 
3. Coalitions and modes of change in IOs 
We have seen that for HI analysis to be relevant, formal institutional power is not to be reducible to 
exogenous or ‘material’ power. Only where institutions confer independent powers on their participants 
can they endogenously constrain the pathway of institutional change. Yet indeed, the tension between 
endogenous organizational powers and exogenous ‘material’ powers does not only mark domestic, but 
also international politics. On the one hand, IOs are growing older, but do not always adapt to changing 
power constellations – the United Nations Security Council prominently illustrates such inertia and lock-
in. On the other hand, in most IOs smaller states are overrepresented by design (Stone, 2011). Therefore, 
politics in IOs is shaped by two separate dimensions of state power: formal authority as granted via 
voting rights or seats in executive organs, and material powers that are largely independent from these 
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institutional privileges. The fungibility of such exogenous power resources depends on their relevance 
to the IO’s activities: money and donations will be most important in service providing IOs such as 
UNICEF, military forces matter in particular to security organizations such as NATO, and market size 
is a crucial asset in trade organizations such as the WTO. States bring these material powers to bear on 
the process of IO change, but they have to do so within the constraints posed by existing rules. Hence 
endogenously, smaller states can be in a position to block reform attempts or they may be able to set 
reform agendas that are undesired by the great powers.  
The varied configurations that can result from the interaction between formal and material powers in 
IOs can be mapped in a simple heuristic of different types of reform coalitions. Reform coalitions here 
refer to groups of like-minded member states that seek to alter IOs according to their preferences. 
Evidently, in real-world reform processes IO bureaucrats and non-state actors are also part of reform 
coalitions (see below), yet like in PA analysis we shall focus on the most decisive level of member state 
powers and preferences – just that the power dimension is made more complex in here. The heuristic 
differentiates institutional constellations depending on whether reform coalitions control organizational 
vetoes (formal power), crucial external resources (material power), or both. This distinction allows us 
to situate the typical domains of PA and HI analysis and opens analytical space for HI-inspired 
conjectures about typical patterns of gradual transformations in IOs (see figure 1).  
- Figure 1 about here - 
The figure shows two constellations where material and formal powers are congruent (upper left and 
lower right box), i.e. where reform advocats control both sources of power, or none. These are classic 
domains of PA analysis. A constellation of congruence between material and formal power (upper left) 
maps a situation where a state coalition striving for reform can formally decide on and materially back 
up the desired reform agenda. This is the basic PA constellation where deliberate change is to be 
expected. It is mostly to be found in organizations with weighted voting systems such as the Bretton 
Woods institutions. For example, the World Bank’s ‘greening of aid’ over the 1990s is a well-known 
case of principal-induced reform. As Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney have argued, the Bank 
significantly altered its lending practices after its main principals called for the incorporation of 
	
	
8 
	
environmental principles into its development projects. These appeals were backed up by material 
incentives such as the withholding of financial contributions (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Hence, the 
main donors’ control of both decisional power and material resources led to a directed change within 
the Bank. There are manifold comparable cases of steered reform in IOs through treaty reform or 
concerted policy change. A prominent example of negotiated change is the transition from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Notably, 
with the ‘single undertaking’ principle states here bought into the entire WTO ‘package’ rather than 
picking and choosing among sub-regimes, and thereby deliberately prevented fragmentation and 
layering within the WTO. Another recent case of concerted reform is the (re-)authorization of the 
International Monetary Fund in the context of the 2008/9 world financial crisis, which was backed up 
by a major replenishment of IMF funds.  
Evidently, coherent reforms also take place in IOs that do not have weighted voting systems such as 
those organizations where the one state, one vote principle applies. But these organizations have a 
greater potential for a clash of coalitions with different power resources. In one possible constellation 
the reform coalition has formal control without material backup (lower left): Where a coalition of ‘small’ 
states commands a formal majority in IO bodies and decides on a reform, the backlash of the decision 
may be that great powers diminish their material support, or even turn to other organizations instead. 
This weakens the IO relative to other organizations, and thus results in a relative loss of impact within 
its organizational field. In analogy to the notion of regulatory drift outlined above – as referring to the 
changing impact of rules (Hacker, 2004) – such developments can be labeled  instances of 
organizational drift, i.e. a changed impact of IOs on their domain of activity.  
IO drift is a major tendency in an international environment that offers states myriad opportunities for 
forum shopping (see Alter and Meunier, 2009). In an extreme form, drift can entail a full-blown exit of 
member states, which happened for example during the United Nations Educational, Cultural and 
Scientific Organization’s (UNESCO’s) struggle over a New World Information Communication Order 
(NWICO) in the 1970s. The endorsement of the NWICO agenda was pushed by a coalition of 
developing countries but led to fierce ideological confrontations and moved the US and the United 
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Kingdom not only to withhold financial contributions, but in fact to temporarily quit membership during 
the 1980s  (Singh, 2011, p. 110–120). Although not entailing all-out exit, similar developments took 
place in the World Health Organization (WHO), for example after World Health Assembly (WHA) 
endorsed the Model List of Essential Medicines in the late 1970s. This motivated the United States to 
withhold its contributions and to force a policy of zero real growth on the organization – i.e. a constant 
decline in regular budgetary contributions. The US and other donor states increasingly turned to other 
venues for pursuing global health policies, for example the World Bank or the public-private 
partnerships that were founded at the turn of the millennium (Lee, 2009, p. 89-122). Instances of IO drift 
raise important questions regarding the institutional choices made by states (Jupille, Mattli and Snidal, 
2013). Yet they also raise the question of how institutions change where power diffuses. HI-inspired 
analyses of IO drift could thus investigate how drift feeds back on the ‘source institutions’ – for example 
whether they are redeployed to new purposes, hollowed out, or used as strategic venues of institutional 
conflict (see Raustiala and Victor, 2004).  
The opposite constellation is that powerful states sponsor change in IOs but cannot overturn internal 
veto players, i.e. they hold material power without formal control (upper right). This constellation is 
likely to induce layering as a dominant reform strategy. Where an all-out reform is unavailable due to 
formal lock-in or decisional blockades, materially powerful reform coalitions can opt for circumventing 
established structures. They do so by grafting additional elements on top of the organizational core. An 
illustrative example of this dynamic is the WHO’s positioning vis-à-vis the post-WWII population 
control movement. As the Vatican and catholic member states opposed initiatives to engage in 
population planning at the WHO, by the 1960s proponents of population planning turned to creating a 
‘special’ WHO program for human reproduction. This program was relatively independent from core 
WHO decision-making structures and operational procedures, mainly thanks to its financing through 
voluntary donations (Finkle and Crane, 1976). This case exemplifies a more general trend in many 
United Nations organizations that are increasingly funded with ‘extrabudgetary’ contributions by 
affluent donors. Extrabudgetary donations are usually earmarked for specific IO units and programs and 
thus often reflect unilateral preferences. This also applies to the World Bank that today operates more 
than 1.000 so-called trust funds that are unilaterally funded and only loosely integrated with core 
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structures of the Bank (Distler, 2012). Such additions of new organizational layers not only render IOs 
more complex, but can considerably transform them. Over time, the layered elements may replace or 
render irrelevant core institutions without that these have been formally replaced (see Chwieroth, 2013). 
Finally, the lower right box where neither endogenous nor exogenous resources are mobilized for IO 
reform is also a common and far from irrelevant constellation. This situation where rules and policies 
are not challenged by any state coalition only looks like non-change at first glance. Here IO researchers 
need to look at factors beyond member state coalitions to identify drivers of change.  PA analysis here 
offers a fruitful hypothesis, suggesting that  in the absence of state-led reform, bureaucratic agency 
becomes decisive for IO change – either in the form of routine adaptation within the delegated mandate, 
or in the form of rent-seeking and mission creep (Copelovitch, 2010). This is not to say that IO 
bureaucracies only influence IO change where states are inactive (see Johnson, 2013). Bureaucrats are 
usually part of reform coalitions, collaborating with like-minded states across IO boundaries (see 
Hanrieder, 2013). However, the heuristic outlined in here contributes to specifying under what 
institutional conditions their role should be of particular relevance.  
.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This research note has offered a rationale for identifying different constellations among IO member 
states that should trigger different modes of change in IOs. Evidently, the types of change outlined herein 
will take different shapes in different contexts and need to be investigated empirically. Modes of change 
may also interact and follow, if not trigger each other. The above heuristic can thus only provide a 
starting point, albeit hopefully a productive one, for examining institutional dynamics of change in 
international organizations. Research along these lines will need to take into account that the concepts 
introduced above are not fully specified hypotheses to be tested, but rather thinking tools to be refined 
through empirical analysis (see van der Heijden, 2011, 2013). These tools must be applied to generate 
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distinct insights about institutional dynamic in global politics, a political sphere which increasingly 
resembles ‘HI conditions’ rather than ‘PA conditions’: 
. 
For as IOs grow older and thereby also more resilient (Ingram and Torfason, 2010, p. 598), and as the 
international order grows more institutionalized, complex institutional dynamics will increasingly shape 
the evolution of IOs. Theories of gradual institutional change can make an important contribution here 
in that they conceptualize how sedimented privileges interact with external challenges to bring about 
distinct modes of institutional change. HI-inspired research can deepen our understanding of 
institutional development in an IO landscape that is growing more complex by the day. The long-term 
dynamics arising from different modes of change, their intended and unintended effects, as well as their 
typical sequences and interactions amongst different pathways, should be central topics in future 
research on IO change. 
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